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Abstract
Crowdsourcing can solve problems that current fully automated systems can-
not. Its effectiveness depends on the reliability, accuracy, and speed of the crowd
workers that drive it. These objectives are frequently at odds with one another. For
instance, how much time should workers be given to discover and propose new
solutions versus deliberate over those currently proposed? How do we determine
if discovering a new answer is appropriate at all? And how do we manage work-
ers who lack the expertise or attention needed to provide useful input to a given
task? We present a mechanism that uses distinct payoffs for three possible worker
actions—propose, vote, or abstain—to provide workers with the necessary incen-
tives to guarantee an effective (or even optimal) balance between searching for
new answers, assessing those currently available, and, when they have insufficient
expertise or insight for the task at hand, abstaining. We provide a novel game the-
oretic analysis for this mechanism and test it experimentally on an image-labeling
problem and show that it allows a system to reliably control the balance between
discovering new answers and converging to existing ones.
Introduction
The rapidly increasing popularity of crowdsourcing is due in large part to its demon-
strated capability to perform tasks that lie far beyond the reach of current fully au-
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Figure 1: An example of the sort of problems that the propose-vote-abstain can solve.
Workers are asked to label a series of images. They are shown potential payoffs, and
asked to choose between voting, proposing, or abstaining from contributing an answer.
2
tomated systems, and to marshal human resources more efficiently than offline ap-
proaches can. Prior work has shown that crowdsourcing can complete tasks such
as editing documents [BLM+10], labeling images [vAD04], discovering the folding
structure of protein [CKT+10], discovering celestial bodies [LSS+08], and evaluating
the quality of products and services [AKM12]. Recent advances have even led to real
time services [LMW+11, LWN+13, BBMK11, AIP11, AIT11], such assistance tech-
nology that answers visual questions [BJJ+10, LTZ+13] or help find accessible paths
[HLF13] for blind users, and captions audio in any setting for deaf and hard of hearing
users [LMS+12].
Across this wide range of applications, crowdsourcing relies on the mystery of hu-
man intelligence and the highly distributed nature of the crowd to gain its advantages.
This leads to two basic design problems: how to motivate the crowd to contribute good
information and how to integrate this information into a coherent solution. Eliciting
and integrating multiple workers responses has become a key attribute of many crowd-
powered systems – for instance, prior work has investigated how to coordinate and
aggregate the input of multiple workers to determine the best edits to make in a docu-
ment [BLM+10], combine real-time interface control input [LMW+11], and determine
the best response to provide in a conversation [LWN+13].
The relationship between data production and filtering is complex. In general, more
workers contributing data means more filtering is necessary, which increases the over-
all cost of the task, in terms of (human or otherwise) computing resources. On the
other hand, if too little effort is spent on discovery then the results may be unsatisfy-
ing. Additionally, if as here we assume that humans perform both tasks then we need
to respect the competencies and preferences of these workers and route them to the
particular tasks that they are most fit to perform.
In this paper we explore the use of game-theoretic principals to achieve the right
balance between data production and filtering. We present the propose-vote-decline
mechanism. Each crowd worker is given a choice among proposing an answer, voting
among the answers proposed so far, or abstaining, i.e., doing nothing. When a stopping
condition is reached, the mechanism returns the answer with the most votes. Workers
are paid a base amount, with bonuses if they propose or vote for the winning answer.
Much of the game theoretic research on crowdsourcing falls into one of three cate-
gories. The first studies crowdsourced contests, in which participants compete in some
sort of creative task, such as discovering the folding structure of protein [CKT+10]
(where workers compete for high scores) or design a new collaborative filtering algo-
rithm for Netflix [BK07] (where workers competed for a cash prize). This research
typically views crowdsourcing as an all-pay auction [DV09]. Studies have compared
the performance (in terms of market efficiency) of winner-take-all versus distributed
reward structures [BLL11, MS01, MS06, AS09, CHS12]. In most of this work, the
amount of time in which a crowd worker is engaged can be very long, the value func-
tion for the contributions is public and objective, and which worker(s) are rewarded is
determined by a principal actor. The major strategic problem the workers face is thus
to determine how much effort they should expend. In this work, we are also interested
in determining the best contribution(s).
In contrast, however, we are interested in situations in which evaluation is subjec-
tive in nature and there may be a great deal of uncertainty about what the “best” con-
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tribution is. We assume that the wisdom of the crowd is the best arbiter of quality—an
assumption that is valid in many settings. We also assume that workers are engaged for
short periods of time and paid a small amount for their contributions. These assump-
tions hold true in many crowdsourcing applications. Yet under these assumptions it is
not realistic for workers to choose strategically the amount of effort they will expend
on their contributions, as the range of effort levels available to choose from is quite nar-
row. Rather, workers can choose strategically whether to propose a new contribution,
endorse (by voting for) an existing contribution, or abstain altogether, and our goal is
to design mechanisms that provide the best answer available on demand and quickly
converge to an optimal answer.
The second major category of game theory applied to crowdsourcing deals with
recommender systems. Like the present paper, much this work [RV97, Pre04, MRZ05,
JF05, JF07, WP12], assumes that rating is a subjective process and use voting to per-
form evaluation. Unlike our work, much of this research assumes that the alternatives
to evaluate are predetermined. A notable exception is Gao et al. [GBKG12] who, like
us, consider jointly the proposal and voting processes. However, unlike us, they con-
sider both processes as distinct with distinct workers assigned to distinct roles as voters
or authors, and where the voters evaluate the authors, not their contributions. By con-
trast, we allow the workers to determine the roles they wish to play and rather consider
the effect different incentives have on the roles they chose.
Nearly all of the previously-mentioned work assumes that the workers are syn-
chronized and that they play their moves simultaneously. By contrast, we assume that
workers are asynchronous and play sequentially. This makes the analysis somewhat
more complex, however it allows to study real-time concerns.
The third major stream of game-theoretic research considered control-theoretic
mechanisms, primarily in settings where workers are engaging over relatively long
periods of time, as in citizen science. Kamar et al. use such partially-observeable
Markov decision processes to study a crowdsourcing problem in which the workers
procede in a series of rounds, and describe an efficient algorithm that, in their case,
learns an optimal policy [KHH12].
Social choice theory has also been used in the context of crowdsourcing, say, to
power collaborative filtering. Parkes and Procaccia study social choice functions [PP13]
embedded in Markov decision processes. These systems consider game-theoretic be-
havior from the requester’s rather than the worker’s perspective. We, on the other hand,
are concerned with the strategies of the workers.
Hemaspaandra et al. [HHR14] consider online voting where the agents vote se-
quentially and each agent may know the votes of the preceding agents, but not the
succeeding ones. The alternatives to choose from, however, are know in advances to
all agents. They are primary concerned with manipulation in the setting. In our setting,
the alternatives available change dynamically over time. Also, we do not directly study
manipulation in this paper. We discuss both of this issues in the limitations section.
Like most social choice research, both works above assume that all alternatives are
known to all the beforehand. By contrast, the dynamic discovery of the alternatives
(proposals) is a central goal of our system, and so we cannot assume that the alterna-
tives are known beforehand.
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The Propose-Vote-Abstain Mechanism
Each propose-vote-abstain round begins with a request—for information or an answer
to a specific question—by the requester. Workers are then recruited into the system.
As soon as each worker joins, he or she is presented with the request and all the
contributions proposed so far by the previous workers. The new worker is then offered
the following choices: propose a new contribution, for a payoff of pi if that answer
eventually receives the most votes, vote for one of the contribution that has already
been proposed, for a payoff of ν if that contribution eventually receives the most votes,
or abstain for an unconditional payoff of α. If at termination more than one contribution
has the most votes, then one of them is selected uniformly at random as the winner.
Crucially, no worker knows the number of votes each existing contribution has
received, nor how many workers have already played, nor how many workers total
have been recruited. This helps curb the majority effect, though obviously a strategic
player would vote for the candidate believed to be the one most preferred by the other
voters.
The process continues until some stopping condition is reached. This could be after
a fixed number of workers respond, or one (or more) contribution receives a certain
minimum number of votes.
In this paper, we assume that the payoff structure (pi, ν, α) is fixed per round (i.e.,
the same for all workers) and only consider single round settings, i.e., each worker
makes exactly one move (vote, propose, abstain). Multiround settings are also natural
to consider, especially in the context of highly interactive, deliberative group problem
solving, or in realtime streaming situations when the mechanism must continuously
emit solutions (or receive new requests based on previous solutions). However, single
round settings are common enough to use them in this first study on the mechanism.
It is also reasonable to consider variations in which (pi, ν, α) vary dynamically
within a single round. Likewise, the requirement that only one alternative be chosen or
that plurality is the social choice function can be generalized. Such considerations are
beyond the scope of this paper.
Modeling Worker Behavior
From the theoretical perspective we view the propose-vote-abstain mechanism as a
single round, sequential-play, extensive-form game. Doing so helps us to reason about
how different incentive structures may lead to different outcomes. Here we provide a
number of baseline results, and give a few glimpses into how the same framework can
be used to model real-world behavior. Our assumptions are inspired by a scenario that
is arguably not likely to occur in practice, but which here provides very useful baseline.
Catastrophic Freeloading
We call this scenario Catastrophic Freeloading. It describes a situation in which no
worker is willing to put any effort into proposing or voting, but is willing to randomly
vote or propose if doing so yields a higher expected payoff than abstaining. We describe
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it in terms of a belief model in which each worker is completely oblivious to the choices
available and, furthermore, believe that all other workers are similarly obviously.
This scenario is important to consider because it describes the amount of data pro-
duced by a completely ignorant and unmotivated (but strategically clever) workforce
and estimates the cost (in worker payments) to the system for that data.
In particular, we make the following assumptions.
1. The game has a single turn with a indeterminate (and unknown to the workers)
number of players.
2. Workers play sequentially, one at a time.
3. The game does not terminate unless there is at least one answer proposed and
one vote.
4. We assume that all players have equal confidence in any alternative being better
than another, including those the players themselves may propose.
5. The only information the workers know about the system are the candidate an-
swers and the intial request for proposals.
6. The tasks required of the worker are simple and require a fixed time and energy
commitment.
Assumptions (4)–(5) mean effectively that the only information we have to distin-
guish one state (i.e., set of candidate answers) from another is the number of alterna-
tives mt proposed so far, where t is the current time. (4) lets us assume that the votes
cast at any time are uniformly distributed at random from among all alternatives avail-
able at that time. That is, we assume here that voting is effectively random selection.
Essentially, this means that all workers are completely ignorant about the alternatives
available to them, and they believe that all the other workers share this level of igno-
rance. Thus, the most effective way to choose an alternative is by blind guessing. It
ignores shared biases, basic and expert knowledge, irrational behavior, and many other
factors that might lead to more complex behavior.
These catastrophic freeloading assumptions are obviously very strong, so much so
that any notion of “preference” over the set of proposals is all but erased. We take it to
be a baseline condition, against which assumptions accounting for worker preferences
can be measured. This is, admittedly, a small step, but a necessary one, for how to
model worker preferences and—as is crucial in game theoretic considerations—beliefs
about other workers’ preferences—is not a straightforward problem, nor one that can
be easily generalized across a potentially broad spectrum of potential applications.
An alternative view of these assumptions is they reflect the actions of a worker that
is completely disengaged in the process, i.e., “phoning it in.” It could be seen as an
extreme case where all workers are freeloaders who want to maximize their expected
reward while spending a minimum amount of time.
Regarding (6), in prior, auction-based research [MS01] workers had complete in-
formation about the game and were allowed to choose strategically the amount of effort
to expend on the problem. Under those assumptions the purpose of the mechanism was
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to provide inventives for the voters to provide the right amount of effort. In microtask
settings, such as the one on which our experiment is based, workers tend to be engaged
for short amounts of time and are not expected to bring much effort to any one transac-
tion. Thus, from a design perspective it is much more important to focus on the beliefs
and knowledge the workers can bring to the task right now, as opposed to the amount
of effort they could spend on more open-ended tasks.
With these assumptions in mind, Theorem 1 tells us quite a bit about the baseline
behavior of the crowd, from a mechanism design perspective. In particular, it considers,
given a
Theorem 1. Given some target number of candidate proposals m ∈ N, any cost struc-
ture (pi, ν, α) that satisfies (m + 1) · α > ν > m · α and (m + 1) · ν > pi > m · ν
generates a dominant strategy in which the first m workers propose and the remaining
workers vote.
Theorem 1 follows from the propositions below. It tells us that, when workers are
maximally uncertain about the choices at hand then (1) the abstention payoff provides
an incentive for limiting the number of proposals, though not the number of votes; and
(2) the workers monotonically propose first and vote later, never returning again to
propose.
Before we present these propositions, let us first provide some useful notation and
observations. Let mt denote the number of candidate proposals present for the tth
worker to choose from. Note that under the above assumptions this is effectively all
that the worker observes about the candidate proposals, as he or she is completely
oblivious to the content of each proposal. Thus, all we need to know about the state in
order to model worker behavior is mt for each worker t. Thus, for any other worker
t′, if mt = m′t then t and t
′ have the same dominant strategy. In particular, if some
dominant strategy results in mt+1 = mt then all remaining workers will repeat this
action for the rest of the game. This is the case whenever the dominant strategy at mt
is to vote or to abstain. If the dominant strategy is to propose, then mt+1 = mt + 1.
This simple observation is key to understanding the propositions.
Let S∗(mt) denote the dominant strategy for mt.
Proposition 2 provides basic results about worker strategies, in particular sheds
light on the role that abstention plays.
Proposition 2. Under assumptions (4)–(5):
1. If α ≥ min{pi, ν} then abstaining is a dominant strategy for all players.
2. If min{pi, ν}/(mt +1) < α then for worker t abstaining has a greater expected
payoff than proposing.
3. If ν/mt < α then for worker t abstaining has a greater expected payoff than
voting.
Proof. (1) is obvious.
(2)—(3) follow from assumption (4), in that having uniform confidence in each
candidate–and assuming that all workers feel similarly—means that any voter is equally
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likely to chose any candidate currently available, so that the expected payoff for propos-
ing or voting is upper bounded by dividing the base reward pi or ν among the number
of proposals available to vote on after the worker moves, which is mt + 1 if worker
t proposes and mt if worker t votes. For (2), note additionally that whenever propos-
ing would create so many candidates as to give voting a lower expected payoff than
abstaining, proposing has a lower expected payoff than abstaining.
Next, we study conditions that lead to proposal and voting.
Proposition 3. If ν > pi > α then S∗(1) = vote.
Proposition 3 is obvious.
While the earlier propositions provide important boundary results, Proposition 4
provides insight on the system state as the game unfolds. The proposition works back-
wards, but finding a state in which workers vote. Since voting does not change the state,
the system will remain in this state until termination. We then use structural induction
to work backwards from this voting state to characterize the rest of the state space.
Proposition 4. If pi > ν > α then:
1. If mt > ν/α, then S∗(mt) = abstain.
2. If mt + 1 > ν/α > mt > 0 then S∗(mt) = vote.
3. For all t, w,mt,mw ∈ N such that w > t, mw > mt > 0, S∗(mw) = vote and,
for all u : mw > mu > mt, it holds that S∗(mu) = propose:
(a) If mt > ν ·mw/pi then S∗(mt) = propose.
(b) If mt < ν ·mw/pi then S∗(mt) = vote.
Let mν0 denote bν/αc and, for all i ≥ 0, let mνi+1 = bpi ·mνi /νc.
4. For all i ≥ 0 if mνi > 0 then S∗(mνi ) = vote.
5. For all mt such that mt ≤ ν/α and mt 6∈ {mνi }, S∗(mt) = propose.
Proof. Item (1) follows from Proposition 2.3.
For item (2), if mt + 1 > ν/α > mt then voting has a higher expected payoff
than abstaining, as long as no one else proposes. But proposing would make the ex-
pected payoff for voting less than for abstaining. Consequently, the expected payoff for
proposing is zero at this point (assuming all subsequent workers act to optimize their
expected payoffs). Thus voting has the highest expected payoff.
For item (3), if mt > ν ·mw/pi then pi/mw, the expected payoff for proposing is
greater than ν/mt the expected payoff for voting, which is greater than α (otherwise
S∗(mw) 6= vote). If mt < ν ·mw/pi then by a similar argument the expected payoff
for voting is greater than proposing.
Items (4) and (5) follows by applying item (3) inductively to each mνi .
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Items (4) and (5) show that even in the relatively small state space we consider
here that the space of dominant strategies is fairly rich, varying between proposing and
voting for different values of mt. However, little of it is reachable in practice, as the
state does not change one workers start voter.
Finally Proposition 5 provides initial conditions.
Proposition 5. If α < min{pi, ν} then S∗(0) = propose.
Proof. If worker 0 proposes then its expected payoff is greater than abstaining or voting
as long as there are never more than min{ν, pi}/α proposals. But this will never happen
because of Proposition 2.2.
With these results in mind, we can now prove Theorem 1.
Proof (of Theorem 1). For a given target number of proposals m and cost structure
(pi, ν, α) that satisfies (m + 1) · α > ν > m · α and (m + 1) · ν > pi > m · ν,
note that the only i ∈ N for which mνi > 0 is i = 0. Thus, by Propositions 4.4–
refit:whenever-propose, S∗(m) = vote and for all m′ between 0 and m (exclusive),
S∗(m′) = propose. By Proposition 5, S∗(0) = propose.
What conclusions should a system designer draw from these results? Certainly, in
order to making voting or proposing incentive compatible actions, it is obvious that
voting must pay more than abstaining, and proposing must pay more than voting. It
is also reasonable to assume that the more one pays for each action, the more effort
workers will spend to perform them. These results show that there is a another side
to the matter: that raising incentives for proposing and voting can also increase the
amount of bad data gathered. Of course, the catastrophic freeloader scenario we study
here may not apply often in practice. Even when there are freeloaders, they may not
dominate the system, and even when they do, it is not clear that the freeloaders would
themselves be aware of their dominant situation and so might not adopt the strategies
seen here (that is, they might behave differently if they believed that some of the other
workers are putting effort and attention into their work).
The results also suggest that conscientious, informed workers will act when freeload-
ers may not, and so, to avoid freeloading, the best approach is to make voting pay more
than abstention, but less than twice as much, and make proposing pay twice as much
as voting, but less than twice as much. Under such a cost structure, Theorem 1 says
that under the catastrophic freeloading modeling, one freeloading might propose (and
any number of them could vote as long as there is only one proposal), but any remain-
ing proposals and votes would come from workers who more sincerely believe in their
choices.
Experiments
We recruited 111 Mechanical Turk workers and asked them to view a set of 5 images
(presented in random order) and either propose, vote for, or abstain from contributing
to the image’s description. A round consists of a single image with a fixed (i.e., the
same for all workers in the round) payoff structure (i.e., fixed prices) for proposing,
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pi ν workers proposals votes abstains
$0.20 $0.04 20 39 60 1
$0.12 $0.05 33 41 117 7
$0.08 $0.08 20 13 86 1
$0.05 $0.12 10 13 36 0
$0.04 $0.20 18 13 76 3
Table 1: Basic statistics from the experiments. The payment for abstaining is fixed at
$0.02. Each HIT asks each worker about the same five images, shown in Figure 2, for
proposal and voting payoffs pi and ν, respectively.
voting, and abstaining. All five rounds assigned to each worker had the same price
structure There were in total five different payoff structures, leading to 25 rounds total.
Table 1 shows the five payoff structures and how the workers and their actions
distribute over them.
Figure 2 shows the images to be labeled. In order to not bias the experiments
towards specific domains, the images were chosen to be vague.
Figure 3 shows the results of our tests on the number of proposals generated. As
the payment for voting becomes large relative to the proposal payment, the number of
total answers generated by the system significantly decreases from an average of 7.8
responses to 1 response for all 5 pictures we saw (p < .0001). The decreasing trend
was linear with R2 = 0.802. Note that there is a disproportional drop at the break-even
point when payment is equal for both options. This is consistent with what we expect
because voting requires less effort than generating a response, so there is a slight bias
in its favor.
While all of the images eventually converged to a single response as the vote pay-
ment increased, the number of responses generated in the opposing case (where the pro-
posal reward is high and workers are incentivized to generate several answers) varies
from 5 to 10 responses each. This likely depends on how subjective the image is and
how many answer could be considered plausible with high confidence. This trend is
seen throughout the results as each response set trends towards a single response. This
suggests that the content of the task does play a role in worker trends, but in the con-
vergent limit this can be overridden by financial incentives.
Overvoting
One problem we did not expect to encounter to such a degree was overvoting (mainly
because we assumed that workers would expect for us to check for this). It is possible
for workers who choose to vote to do so more than once to do so simply by hitting
the “back” button on their browser. It is not clear whether this happens accidentally or
intentionally, however, Table 2 shows the total number of over- versus actual- votes in
the rounds of each price structure. The amount of overvoting in the second and fifth
price structures in particular seems too high to be solely accidental.
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IMG1
IMG2
IMG3
IMG4 IMG5
Figure 2: The images used in the experiments.
11
Figure 3: Results from varying relative payments for voting and proposing responses
to an image description task.
Theoretical Predictions
How did the workers in our experiment fare against the theoretical predictions? The
theory predicts that whenever the payoffs for proposing and voting are greater than the
payoff for abstaining then the first worker will propose and at least one worker will
vote. This was consistent with our experiments.
It also predicts that when the payoff for abstaining is greater than either voting or
proposing then no one will vote or propose. We used such a payoff structure in one of
our training rounds, and in none of those cases did a worker propose or vote.
Additionally, the theory predicts that there would be no abstentions. Table 1 shows
that, in fact, few workers ever abstained.
Moving beyond these basic results, the theory predicts that, under the catastrophic
freeloader, there are two different values that upper bound the number of proposals:
namely pi/α and ν/α, and min{pi/ν, 1}, where pi, ν, and α are the payoffs for, respec-
tively, proposing, voting and abstaining. Table 3 shows the number of rounds where
the number of proposals exceeds at least one of these bounds.
These results, though admittedly of a preliminary nature, might support the hypoth-
esis that pi/α is an effective upper bound on the proposals. In terms of our worker’s
beliefs (and under standard bounded rationality assumptions), this could suggest that,
when it comes to proposing new contributions, workers have little confidence in their
proposals.
The results also show that the remaining bounds—ν/α, and min{pi/ν, 1}—having
do with how with the expected payoff to future voters and thus about what the current
worker thinks of the competence of future workers to vote for his or her contribution, if
the current worker proposes, are frequently violated. This would seem to suggest that
workers, even though they are not confident about their ideas, are rather more confident
about the ability of future voters to make the right choice.
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number of number of
voting actual
pi ν workers votes
$0.20 $0.04 60 69
$0.12 $0.05 117 147
$0.08 $0.08 86 90
$0.05 $0.12 36 36
$0.04 $0.20 76 124
total 375 464
Table 2: The number of votes registered for each round in each payoff structure com-
pared to the number of workers who choose to vote. Overvoting occurs when workers
reload a screen and can be accidental or intentional. Lines two five seem to show
evidence of cheating. The payment for abstaining is fixed at $0.02.
# rounds where # proposals exceeds
pi ν pi/α min{pi/ν, 1} ν/α
20 4 0 5 0
12 5 2 5 5
8 8 0 0 4
5 12 0 0 2
4 20 1 0 4
total 3 10 15
winners 0 4 4
Table 3: How does actual worker behavior compare to the theoretical predictions under
the zero knowledge assumption? This table looks at three values that upper bound the
number of proposals under those predictions. The values are based on the payoffs for
proposing, pi, voting, ν, and abstaining α. Note that the maximum number of rounds
for each price structure is five.
Another takeaway is that the number of times a winning contribution proposed af-
ter any one of the three boundaries is violated is very small (eight total). The theory
suggests that a rational worker would violate these boundaries only if the worker was
confident in having an answer. Our results might suggest that such a worker’s confi-
dence is often misplaced.
Regarding monoticity, we looked at the order in which votes and proposals appear.
Rather than all proposals appear first, followed by all votes, with no interleaving, votes
and proposals were in face interspersed. Consequently, later proposals were eligible
for fewer votes. Figure 4 show the percentage of voting workers who did so after the
last contribution was proposed.
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Figure 4: Percentage of votes available to the last contribution. In our experiments we
observed that—contrary to prediction—workers do not all propose first and then vote
after all proposals appear; proposals and votes are interleaved. Thus, proposals that
appear earlier are generally eligible for more votes than those that appear later.
Discussion
Among our incoming assumptions was that the time commitment and financial benefits
to microtasking are so small that workers do not make decisions about the amount of
effort to put into a task. The possible existence of cheating among voters suggests that
worker effort, even at this low-stakes level, must still be considered. We are curious
about the motivations of the cheaters. Do they think that cheating gives them a leg up
on their competitors, or do they assume that everyone else is doing and so they need to
follow suit just to keep up with their peers?
From a theoretical perspective, voting systems in which the alternatives to choose
from and votes themselves are added asynchronously, in sequence, presents a number
of interesting challenges. For instance, in general there is a bias towards the alterna-
tives that appear earlier, since they have a long time frame within which to gather votes.
There are several ways to mitigate this bias, e.g., by fixing the interval of time between
when a contribution is proposed and when it can last be voted on, so that all contri-
butions have the same amount of time to garner votes. One can also use importance
sampling or impose halting conditions that guarantee each proposal gets a fair chance
of being selected. How to best do so depends on the application at hand and is a matter
of further study.
Limitations
There are a number of limitations to our approach. The first is that game theory gener-
ally imposes a number of simplifying assumptions on the behavior of individuals. This
is usually necessary to make the theory tractable, but often leads to behavior that is not
observed in practice. Our view hear is that it can nonetheless go a long way in explain-
ing observed behavior if it is regarded as presenting an ideal case (or null hypothesis)
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and we reflect on how (or if) observed behavior deviates from it.
Another limitation is that we do not consider the possibility that workers could
collude, say, to propose an answer and then all vote for it. Clearly, the incentive mech-
anism does not account for this. Voting is well known to be vulnerable to manipulation
under ideal conditions, however, how vulnerable they are in practice is a matter of on-
going research. Another way around this problem is to start with a baseline assumption
about how large such a manipulating coalition can be and then make the worker pool
large enough to negate any effect the manipulators might have. Finally, one can user
worker feedback systems to punish those who manipulate through collusion.
Another limitation is that we are taking the “best” answer to be that chosen by the
majority of the workers. Though this can be effective in certain circumstances—such
as putting general labels on images—but not as well when expert advice is needed. For
instance, if a worker happened to know know that IMG2 was a by the artist Robert
Frank, would he or she propose this information? Or would he or she hold back and
propose something simpler (or not propose at all), expecting this fact to be lost on the
average worker?
While we might expect the latter behavior to dominate, we at least once observed
the former behavior. In one round involving IMG5, the proposal that received the most
votes was a later one that read, “Metal gate blocking a stone staircase that leads up to
an ancient aqueduct.” Perhaps the specificity of the answer conveyed enough authority
to convince voters to support it. (Incidently, the image is of the Colosseum of Rome,
so the proposal is not too far off the mark.)
The rest of the proposals from this round are illuminating to read, as they con-
vey a variety of strategies in proposing answers. They read, in order of appearance,
“gate”, “Protect the place”, “Staircase”, “Fenced steps”, (the winning proposal), “steps
to prison”, “This is a metal grate installed over the staircase to one of Rome’s deterio-
rating ruins” (this proposal is slightly less specific than the winning one, and also less
erroneous), “Ruins are ruins, why want to peep in? Hence the grill-grate!!” (which has
a less authoritative tone than the winning answer, and almost seems to be chiding some
of the other answers for their specificity), “METAL GATE.” Perhaps the difference be-
tween the winning and losing proposals here is that the level of detail (even if false)
and language used in the winning post suggests a higher level of authority in the image
than the losing proposals.
How to account theoretically for more realistic worker beliefs is a subject of future
research, but we sketch some ideas here (we also explore this question experimentally
in the next section). We can for instance assume a belief model where the worker at
time t has beliefs above the relative likelihood of each proposal succeeding so far. We
can represent those beliefs as real numbers wm0 , . . . , wmt ∈ [0, 1], where tm is the
number of proposals at time t mt. Let w′ ∈ [0, 1] represent the worker’s confidence
in his or her own choice. Finally let Pt be a distribution over [0, 1] from which future
worker’s submissions are drawn. The likelihood that the if the worker votes he or she
chooses the contribution proposed at time t′ < t is m′t/
∑
0≤i≤wmt wi. Under the zero
knowledge assumption, each of these weights is identical.
15
Conclusion
In this paper we discussed and formalized a model for eliciting varying levels of di-
versity in contributions from crowd workers. While the individual components of this
contribution are built on common building blocks. The tradeoff in response set size that
we have demonstrated has not been demonstrated before to our knowledge. Our results
suggest future work in exploring why and in what circumstances workers will self-
select out of a task, and provides a basis for exploring mechanism-based self-filtering
of responses by workers.
16
References
[AIP11] Josh Attenberg, Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, and Foster J. Provost. Beat the
machine: Challenging workers to find the unknown unknowns. In Human
Computation, volume WS-11-11 of AAAI Workshops. AAAI, 2011.
[AIT11] Sinan Aral, Panos Ipeirotis, and Sean Taylor. Content and context: Iden-
tifying the impact of qualitative information on consumer choice. In Den-
nis F. Galletta and Ting-Peng Liang, editors, ICIS. Association for Infor-
mation Systems, 2011.
[AKM12] Omar Alonso, Gabriella Kazai, and Stefano Mizzaro. Crowdsourcing for
Search Engine Evaluation. Springer, 2012.
[AS09] Nikolay Archak and Arun Sundararajan. Optimal design of crowdsourc-
ing contests. In ICIS, page 200, 2009.
[BBMK11] M. S. Bernstein, J. Brandt, R. C. Miller, and D. R. Karger. Crowds in Two
Seconds: Enabling Realtime Crowd-powered Interfaces. In Proceedings
of the ACM Symposium on User Interface Software and Technology (UIST
2011), pages 33–42, Santa Barbara, CA, 2011.
[BJJ+10] J. P. Bigham, C. Jayant, H. Ji, G. Little, A. Miller, R. C. Miller, R. Miller,
A. Tatarowicz, White S. White, B., and T. Yeh. VizWiz: nearly real-time
answers to visual questions. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on
User Interface Software and Technology (UIST 2010), pages 333–342,
New York, NY, 2010.
[BK07] Robert M Bell and Yehuda Koren. Lessons from the netflix prize chal-
lenge. ACM SIGKDD Explorations Newsletter, 9(2):75–79, 2007.
[BLL11] Kevin J Boudreau, Nicola Lacetera, and Karim R Lakhani. Incentives
and problem uncertainty in innovation contests: An empirical analysis.
Management Science, 57(5):843–863, 2011.
[BLM+10] Michael S. Bernstein, Greg Little, Robert C. Miller, Bjo¨rn Hartmann,
Mark S. Ackerman, David R. Karger, David Crowell, and Katrina
Panovich. Soylent: a word processor with a crowd inside. In Proceed-
ings of the 23nd annual ACM symposium on User interface software and
technology, UIST ’10, pages 313–322, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[CHS12] Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, and Balasubramanian Sivan. Optimal
crowdsourcing contests. In Yuval Rabani, editor, SODA, pages 856–868.
SIAM, 2012.
[CKT+10] Seth Cooper, Firas Khatib, Adrien Treuille, Janos Barbero, Jeehyung Lee,
Michael Beenen, Andrew Leaver-Fay, David Baker, Zoran Popovic, and
Foldit Players. Predicting protein structures with a multiplayer online
game. Nature, 466(7307):756–760, 2010.
17
[DV09] Dominic DiPalantino and Milan Vojnovic. Crowdsourcing and all-pay
auctions. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic com-
merce, pages 119–128. ACM, 2009.
[GBKG12] Xi Alice Gao, Yoram Bachrach, Peter Key, and Thore Graepel. Quality
expectation-variance tradeoffs in crowdsourcing contests. In AAAI, 2012.
[HHR14] Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A Hemaspaandra, and Jo¨rg Rothe. The com-
plexity of online manipulation of sequential elections. Journal of Com-
puter and System Sciences, 80(4):697–710, 2014.
[HLF13] Kotaro Hara, Vicki Le, and Jon Froehlich. Combining crowdsourcing
and google street view to identify street-level accessibility problems. In
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems, CHI ’13, pages 631–640, New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM.
[JF05] Radu Jurca and Boi Faltings. Enforcing truthful strategies in incentive
compatible reputation mechanisms. In Internet and Network Economics,
pages 268–277. Springer, 2005.
[JF07] Radu Jurca and Boi Faltings. Robust incentive-compatible feedback pay-
ments. In Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Automated Negotiation
and Strategy Design for Electronic Markets, pages 204–218. Springer,
2007.
[KHH12] Ece Kamar, Severin Hacker, and Eric Horvitz. Combining human and
machine intelligence in large-scale crowdsourcing. In Proceedings of
the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multia-
gent Systems - Volume 1, AAMAS ’12, pages 467–474, Richland, SC,
2012. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems.
[LMS+12] W. S. Lasecki, C. D. Miller, A. Sadilek, A. AbuMoussa, and J.P. Bigham.
Real-time captioning by groups of non-experts. In In Submission, 2012.
http://hci.cs.rochester.edu/pubs/pdfs/legion-scribe.pdf.
[LMW+11] W. S. Lasecki, K. I. Murray, S. White, R. C. Miller, and J. P. Bigham.
Real-time Crowd Control of Existing Interfaces. In Proceedings of
the ACM Symposium on User Interface Software and Technology (UIST
2011), pages 23–32, Santa Barbara, CA, 2011.
[LSS+08] Chris J Lintott, Kevin Schawinski, Anzˇe Slosar, Kate Land, Steven Bam-
ford, Daniel Thomas, M Jordan Raddick, Robert C Nichol, Alex Szalay,
Dan Andreescu, et al. Galaxy zoo: morphologies derived from visual in-
spection of galaxies from the sloan digital sky survey. Monthly Notices of
the Royal Astronomical Society, 389(3):1179–1189, 2008.
18
[LTZ+13] Walter S. Lasecki, Phyo Thiha, Yu Zhong, Erin Brady, and Jeffrey P.
Bigham. Answering visual questions with conversational crowd assis-
tants. In Proceedings of the 15th International ACM SIGACCESS Con-
ference on Computers and Accessibility, ASSETS ’13, pages 18:1–18:8,
New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM.
[LWN+13] Walter S Lasecki, Rachel Wesley, Jeffrey Nichols, Anand Kulkarni,
James F Allen, and Jeffrey P Bigham. Chorus: a crowd-powered con-
versational assistant. In Proceedings of the 26th annual ACM symposium
on User interface software and technology, pages 151–162. ACM, 2013.
[MRZ05] Nolan Miller, Paul Resnick, and Richard Zeckhauser. Eliciting infor-
mative feedback: The peer-prediction method. Management Science,
51(9):1359–1373, 2005.
[MS01] Benny Moldovanu and Aner Sela. The optimal allocation of prizes in
contests. American Economic Review, pages 542–558, 2001.
[MS06] Benny Moldovanu and Aner Sela. Contest architecture. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 126(1):70–96, 2006.
[PP13] David C Parkes and Ariel D Procaccia. Dynamic social choice with evolv-
ing preferences. pages 767–773, 2013.
[Pre04] Drazˇen Prelec. A bayesian truth serum for subjective data. Science,
306(5695):462–466, 2004.
[RV97] Paul Resnick and Hal R Varian. Recommender systems. Communications
of the ACM, 40(3):56–58, 1997.
[vAD04] Luis von Ahn and Laura Dabbish. Labeling images with a computer
game. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in
computing systems, CHI ’04, pages 319–326, New York, NY, USA, 2004.
ACM.
[WP12] Jens Witkowski and David C Parkes. Peer prediction without a common
prior. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Com-
merce, pages 964–981. ACM, 2012.
19
